This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate attohttpc


(17 total, 1 possibly insecure)

 encoding_rs^ to date
 encoding_rs_io^ to date
 flate2^ to date
 http^ to date
 log^ to date
 mime^ to date
 multipart^ to date
 native-tls^ to date
 rustls^ to date
 serde^11.0.137up to date
 serde_json^11.0.81up to date
 serde_urlencoded^ to date
 url^22.2.2up to date
 webpki^ to date
 webpki-roots^ to date
 wildmatch^22.1.0up to date
 openssl ⚠️^ insecure

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

 anyhow^11.0.57up to date
 env_logger^ to date
 futures^ to date
 futures-util^ to date
 hyper ⚠️^ insecure
 tokio ⚠️^11.18.2maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^ of date
 tokio-stream^ to date
 warp^ to date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use after free in CMS Signing


Affected versions of the OpenSSL crate used structures after they'd been freed.

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling


hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss


When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel


If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.