This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate actix-tls

Dependencies

(19 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-rt^2.22.11.0up to date
 actix-service^22.0.3up to date
 actix-utils^33.0.1up to date
 futures-core^0.3.70.3.32up to date
 http^11.4.0up to date
 impl-more^0.10.3.1out of date
 pin-project-lite^0.2.70.2.17up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.60.23.37out of date
 rustls-native-certs^0.70.8.3out of date
 rustls-pki-types^11.14.0up to date
 rustls-webpki^0.101.40.103.9out of date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.550.10.76maybe insecure
 tokio^1.23.11.50.0up to date
 tokio-native-tls^0.30.3.1up to date
 tokio-openssl^0.60.6.5up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.4up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 tracing^0.1.300.1.44up to date
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.6out of date

Dev dependencies

(11 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-codec^0.50.5.2up to date
 actix-rt^2.22.11.0up to date
 actix-server^22.6.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 futures-util^0.3.170.3.32up to date
 itertools^0.120.14.0out of date
 pretty_env_logger^0.50.5.0up to date
 rcgen^0.120.14.7out of date
 rustls-pemfile^22.2.0up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.4up to date
 trust-dns-resolver^0.230.23.2up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.