This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate constellation-server

Dependencies

(24 total, 8 outdated, 3 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 log^0.40.4.35up to date
 toml^0.81.2.1+spec-1.1.0out of date
 clap^4.54.6.9up to date
 lazy_static^1.41.5.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.229up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.154up to date
 url_serde^0.20.2.0up to date
 regex^1.101.13.2up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.92up to date
 bb8-redis^0.150.26.0out of date
 actix-web^4.84.20.0up to date
 actix-web-httpauth^0.80.8.3up to date
 hickory-server^0.240.26.3out of date
 hickory-proto ⚠️^0.240.26.3insecure
 hickory-resolver ⚠️^0.240.26.3insecure
 tokio^1.381.54.1up to date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 farmhash^1.11.1.5up to date
 http_req^0.100.14.6out of date
 maxminddb ⚠️^0.240.33.0insecure
 tempfile^3.13.27.0up to date
 flate2^1.01.1.11up to date
 tar^0.40.4.46up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

maxminddb: `Reader::open_mmap` unsoundly marks unsafe memmap operation as safe

RUSTSEC-2025-0132

maxminddb prior to version 0.27 declared Reader::open_mmap as safe despite wrapping an inherently unsafe memmap2 operation with no extra step done to guarantee safety. This could have led to undefined behaviour if the file were to be modified on disk while the memory map was still active.

hickory-proto: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression

RUSTSEC-2026-0119

During message encoding, hickory-proto's BinEncoder stores pointers to labels that are candidates for name compression in a Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>. The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.

A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks.

This is similar to CVE-2024-8508.

We recommend all affected users update to hickory-proto 0.26.1 for the fix.

hickory-proto: Panic on a malformed `alpn` value when parsing SVCB or HTTPS records from text

RUSTSEC-2026-0487

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, the alpn service parameter value is split into a list of protocol names. That step called expect on the result, on the assumption that it could not fail. A malformed value, such as one with an unbalanced quote (alpn="h), two commas in a row or an invalid escape, makes it fail, so the parser panicked instead of returning an error.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix returns a parse error instead. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Panic when an SVCB or HTTPS parameter value is a single quote character

RUSTSEC-2026-0489

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, surrounding double quotes are removed from each service parameter value by checking that the value starts and ends with " and slicing off the first and last character. A value that is a single " (for example alpn=") passes that check, and the slice [1..0] panics.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix rejects a lone quote character with a parse error before the slice. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Zone file lexer panics on a token of 4096 or more characters

RUSTSEC-2026-0490

The zone file lexer read each token in a loop capped at 4,096 iterations, with an assert! on the loop counter as a safety bound. A single token long enough to reach that bound, for example a very long name or character string in a zone file, triggered the assertion and the parser panicked instead of returning the token or an error.

Code that parses zone files from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service.

The fix removes the iteration bound, so the lexer ends only when it reaches the end of a token or an error. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Memory amplification from record counts in the DNS message header

RUSTSEC-2026-0491

When a DNS message is decoded, the vectors for the question, answer, authority and additional sections were created with Vec::with_capacity set to the counts in the message header. Those counts come from the sender and are not checked against the size of the message, so a single small packet that claims 65,535 records makes the decoder reserve memory for that many records (about 18 MB, according to the upstream advisory) before it reads any record and fails.

Any code that decodes untrusted DNS messages is exposed. That includes servers, and clients and resolvers that receive spoofed responses. Repeated packets can drive memory use up and cause a denial of service.

The fix caps the initial capacity at 8 entries and lets the vectors grow as records are actually decoded. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: NSEC3 owner names not checked against the zone in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0505

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0511

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0512

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-resolver: `Resolver::lookup` and `lookup_ip` returned records that failed DNSSEC validation

RUSTSEC-2026-0514

With DNSSEC validation enabled, Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() returned Ok with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves.

Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic.

From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (DnsError::DnssecBogus), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

hickory-proto: Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0530

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Child-side NSEC or NSEC3 record accepted as proof that a delegation has no DS record (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0531

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted an NSEC or NSEC3 record from the child side of a zone cut, which has the SOA bit set, as proof that the parent has no DS record for the delegation (RFC 4035 section 5.2, RFC 6840 section 4.4). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could make a secure delegation look insecure and then forge records in the child zone.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0551

Before 0.26.0-beta.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation ignored the DNS class when grouping records into RRsets and left records of a class other than IN out of signature checking, then marked them secure if the IN records validated. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could add forged records of another class, including a DS record, and have them returned as validated.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.