This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate pigeon-rs

Dependencies

(20 total, 3 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.01.0.101up to date
 rusoto_ses^0.48.00.48.0up to date
 rusoto_core^0.48.00.48.0up to date
 rusoto_credential^0.48.00.48.0up to date
 yaml-rust ⚠️^0.40.4.5maybe insecure
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_yaml^0.9.340.9.34+deprecatedup to date
 tokio^1.371.49.0up to date
 csv^1.31.4.0up to date
 clap^4.5.44.5.57up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.43maybe insecure
 polars^0.320.52.0out of date
 connectorx^0.3.20.4.5out of date
 postgres^0.19.20.19.12up to date
 url^2.52.5.8up to date
 uuid^1.81.20.0up to date
 lettre^0.110.11.19up to date
 infer^0.160.19.0out of date
 bytes ⚠️^1.61.11.1maybe insecure
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 assert_cmd^2.0.142.1.2up to date
 predicates^3.1.03.1.3up to date
 tempfile^3.10.13.24.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

yaml-rust: Uncontrolled recursion leads to abort in deserialization

RUSTSEC-2018-0006

Affected versions of this crate did not prevent deep recursion while deserializing data structures.

This allows an attacker to make a YAML file with deeply nested structures that causes an abort while deserializing it.

The flaw was corrected by checking the recursion depth.

Note: clap 2.33 is not affected by this because it uses yaml-rust in a way that doesn't trigger the vulnerability. More specifically:

  1. The input to the YAML parser is always trusted - is included at compile time via include_str!.

  2. The nesting level is never deep enough to trigger the overflow in practice (at most 5).

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.