This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate bilrost

Dependencies

(12 total, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arrayvec>=0.6.0, <0.80.7.6up to date
 bstr^11.12.1up to date
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 bytestring^11.5.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.340.4.43up to date
 const_panic^0.2.120.2.15up to date
 hashbrown ⚠️>=0.1.0, <0.170.16.1maybe insecure
 smallvec>=1.6.1, <21.15.1up to date
 thin-vec^0.20.2.14up to date
 time ⚠️^0.3.00.3.47maybe insecure
 tinyvec^11.10.0up to date
 pprof>=0.13, <0.160.15.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(10 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arbitrary^1.41.4.2up to date
 chrono>=0.4.340.4.43up to date
 criterion>=0.5, <0.80.8.2out of date
 hashbrown>=0.15.20.16.1up to date
 itertools^0.140.14.0up to date
 proptest>=1.6, <1.71.10.0out of date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 static_assertions^11.1.0up to date
 time ⚠️>=0.3.00.3.47maybe insecure
 yoke>=0.7.1, <0.90.8.1up to date

Build dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 autocfg^1.5.01.5.0up to date

Crate bilrost-derive

Dependencies

(5 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 eyre^0.6.120.6.12up to date
 itertools^0.140.14.0up to date
 proc-macro2^11.0.106up to date
 quote^11.0.44up to date
 syn^22.0.117up to date

Crate bilrost-types

Dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 proptest>=1.6, <1.71.10.0out of date

Crate common

Dependencies

(9 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bstr^1.101.12.1up to date
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 bytestring^1.3.11.5.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.340.4.43up to date
 eyre^0.6.120.6.12up to date
 once_cell^1.20.21.21.3up to date
 regex^1.111.12.3up to date
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.47maybe insecure
 tinyvec^11.10.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hashbrown: Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

The borsh serialization of the HashMap did not follow the borsh specification. It potentially produced non-canonical encodings dependent on insertion order. It also did not perform canonicty checks on decoding.

This can result in consensus splits and cause equivalent objects to be considered distinct.

This was patched in 0.15.1.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.