This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate fernet

Dependencies

(10 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date
 byteorder^11.5.0up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.100.10.75maybe insecure
 getrandom^0.30.4.1out of date
 zeroize^1.01.8.2up to date
 aes^0.80.8.4up to date
 cbc^0.10.1.2up to date
 hmac^0.120.12.1up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 subtle^2.42.6.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.47maybe insecure
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.