This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.
dsh(32 total, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| aes-gcm ⚠️ | ^0.10 | 0.10.3 | maybe insecure |
| arboard | ^3.4 | 3.6.1 | up to date |
| async-trait | ^0.1 | 0.1.89 | up to date |
| base64 | ^0.22 | 0.22.1 | up to date |
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4 | 0.4.43 | maybe insecure |
| clap | ^4.5 | 4.5.54 | up to date |
| clap_complete | ^4.5 | 4.5.65 | up to date |
| ctrlc | ^3.4 | 3.5.1 | up to date |
| env_logger | ^0.11 | 0.11.8 | up to date |
| futures | ^0.3 | 0.3.31 | up to date |
| getch-rs | ^0.2.0 | 0.2.0 | up to date |
| homedir | ^0.3 | 0.3.6 | up to date |
| itertools | ^0.14 | 0.14.0 | up to date |
| keyring | ^3.6 | 3.6.3 | up to date |
| lazy_static | ^1.5 | 1.5.0 | up to date |
| log | ^0.4 | 0.4.29 | up to date |
| open | ^5.3 | 5.3.3 | up to date |
| openidconnect | ^4.0 | 4.0.1 | up to date |
| regex | ^1.11.1 | 1.12.2 | up to date |
| rpassword | ^7.3 | 7.4.0 | up to date |
| rsa ⚠️ | ^0.9 | 0.9.10 | insecure |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.228 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.149 | up to date |
| serde_yaml | ^0.9.33 | 0.9.34+deprecated | up to date |
| sha2 | ^0.10 | 0.10.9 | up to date |
| tabled | ^0.20 | 0.20.0 | up to date |
| termimad | ^0.34 | 0.34.1 | up to date |
| terminal_size | ^0.4 | 0.4.3 | up to date |
| tokio | ^1.43 | 1.49.0 | up to date |
| toml | ^0.9 | 0.9.11+spec-1.1.0 | up to date |
| x509-parser | ^0.18 | 0.18.0 | up to date |
| dsh_api | ^0.8.1 | 0.8.1 | up to date |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannelsDue to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.
aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failureIn the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.
If a program using the aes-gcm crate's decrypt_in_place* APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.
As seen in the implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via buffer.
This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of NIST's publication Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC:
In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned.
This is seems correctly addressed in the AES GCM SIV implementation, where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is returned - this fix is straightforward to implement in AES GCM. To ensure that these types of cases are covered during testing, it would be valuable to add test cases like 23, 24 etc from project wycheproof to ensure that when a bad tag is used, there is an error on decryption and that the plaintext value is not exposed.
To reproduce this issue, I'm using test case 23 from project wycheproof.
let key = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f"));
let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("505152535455565758595a5b"));
let tag = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("d9847dbc326a06e988c77ad3863e6083")); // bad tag
let mut ct = hex!("eb156d081ed6b6b55f4612f021d87b39");
let msg = hex!("202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f");
let aad = hex!("");
let cipher = Aes128Gcm::new(&key);
let _plaintext = cipher.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, &aad, &mut ct, &tag);
assert_eq!(ct, msg);