This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate obadgen

Dependencies

(25 total, 3 outdated, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 biscuit^0.70.7.0up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.42maybe insecure
 clap^4.04.5.49up to date
 const_format^0.20.2.35up to date
 ecdsa^0.160.16.9up to date
 git-version^0.30.3.9up to date
 k256^0.130.13.4up to date
 log^0.40.4.28up to date
 monostate^0.11.0.2out of date
 p256^0.130.13.2up to date
 p384^0.130.13.1up to date
 png^0.18.0-rc.30.18.0up to date
 rcgen^0.140.14.5up to date
 ring ⚠️^0.170.17.14maybe insecure
 rsa ⚠️^0.90.9.8insecure
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.145up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 strum^0.270.27.2up to date
 strum_macros^0.270.27.2up to date
 thiserror^2.02.0.17up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.41up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.20up to date
 typed-builder^0.210.22.0out of date
 xml^0.81.0.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.110.11.8up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.