This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate slauth

Dependencies

(26 total, 5 outdated, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 sha2^0.100.10.8up to date
 hmac^0.120.12.1up to date
 sha-1^0.100.10.1up to date
 time^0.30.3.39up to date
 base32^0.40.5.1out of date
 hex^0.40.4.3up to date
 rsa ⚠️^0.9.20.9.7insecure
 rand^0.8.50.9.0out of date
 x509-parser^0.15.00.17.0out of date
 base64^0.130.22.1out of date
 byteorder^1.41.5.0up to date
 ring ⚠️^0.160.17.13out of date
 untrusted^0.9.00.9.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_repr^0.10.1.20up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_bytes^0.110.11.17up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 serde_cbor^0.110.11.2up to date
 webpki ⚠️^0.220.22.4maybe insecure
 bytes^1.21.10.1up to date
 http^1.01.2.0up to date
 uuid^1.61.15.1up to date
 ed25519-dalek^2.1.02.1.1up to date
 p256^0.13.20.13.2up to date
 indexmap^2.2.62.8.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 serde_cbor^0.110.11.2up to date
 uuid^1.21.15.1up to date
 rand^0.80.9.0out of date
 bytes^1.21.10.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building

RUSTSEC-2023-0052

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

This was previously reported in https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.

webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds

The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.