This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.
slauth(25 total, 3 outdated, 1 insecure, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha2 | ^0.10 | 0.10.8 | up to date |
| hmac | ^0.12 | 0.12.1 | up to date |
| sha-1 | ^0.10 | 0.10.1 | up to date |
| time | ^0.3 | 0.3.36 | up to date |
| base32 | ^0.4 | 0.4.0 | up to date |
| hex | ^0.4 | 0.4.3 | up to date |
| rsa ⚠️ | ^0.9.2 | 0.9.6 | insecure |
| rand | ^0.8.5 | 0.8.5 | up to date |
| x509-parser | ^0.15.0 | 0.16.0 | out of date |
| base64 | ^0.13 | 0.22.0 | out of date |
| byteorder | ^1.4 | 1.5.0 | up to date |
| ring | ^0.16 | 0.17.8 | out of date |
| untrusted | ^0.9.0 | 0.9.0 | up to date |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.198 | up to date |
| serde_repr | ^0.1 | 0.1.19 | up to date |
| serde_derive | ^1.0 | 1.0.198 | up to date |
| serde_bytes | ^0.11 | 0.11.14 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.116 | up to date |
| serde_cbor | ^0.11 | 0.11.2 | up to date |
| webpki ⚠️ | ^0.22 | 0.22.4 | maybe insecure |
| bytes | ^1.2 | 1.6.0 | up to date |
| http | ^1.0 | 1.1.0 | up to date |
| uuid | ^1.6 | 1.8.0 | up to date |
| ed25519-dalek | ^2.1.0 | 2.1.1 | up to date |
| p256 | ^0.13.2 | 0.13.2 | up to date |
(5 total, all up-to-date)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.116 | up to date |
| serde_cbor | ^0.11 | 0.11.2 | up to date |
| uuid | ^1.2 | 1.8.0 | up to date |
| rand | ^0.8 | 0.8.5 | up to date |
| bytes | ^1.2 | 1.6.0 | up to date |
webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path buildingWhen this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.
Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.
This was previously reported in https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.
webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.
rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannelsDue to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.