This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate first_aid_bot_core

Dependencies

(6 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 csv^1.31.4.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.61.11.1maybe insecure
 reqwest^0.120.13.2out of date
 indexmap^2.22.13.0up to date
 const_format^0.20.2.35up to date
 regex^1.10.41.12.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.110.11.9up to date
 test-log^0.20.2.19up to date

Crate bot

Dependencies

(6 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 pretty_env_logger^0.50.5.0up to date
 teloxide^0.120.17.0out of date
 redis^0.251.0.3out of date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 itertools^0.120.14.0out of date
 futures^0.30.3.31up to date

Crate rust_lib_app

Dependencies

(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 openssl ⚠️^0.100.10.75maybe insecure
 flutter_rust_bridge=2.0.0-dev.322.11.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.