Deps.rs

alvidir / rauth

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/repo/github/alvidir/rauth/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/repo/github/alvidir/rauth)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rauth

Dependencies

(31 total, 13 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-web^4.3.14.11.0up to date
 async_once^0.2.60.2.6up to date
 async-trait^0.1.680.1.88up to date
 base64^0.21.20.22.1out of date
 chrono^0.4.260.4.41up to date
 deadpool-lapin^0.10.00.12.1out of date
 dotenv^0.15.00.15.0up to date
 jsonwebtoken^8.3.09.3.1out of date
 lapin^2.2.13.0.0out of date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 lettre^0.10.40.11.17out of date
 libreauth^0.16.00.17.0out of date
 once_cell^1.18.01.21.3up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.540.10.73maybe insecure
 prost^0.11.90.14.1out of date
 protoc^2.28.02.28.0up to date
 rand^0.8.50.9.1out of date
 redis^0.23.00.32.2out of date
 regex^1.8.41.11.1up to date
 reool^0.30.00.30.0up to date
 serde^1.0.1641.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.0.961.0.140up to date
 sha256^1.1.41.6.0up to date
 sqlx ⚠️^0.6.30.8.6out of date
 strum^0.25.00.27.1out of date
 strum_macros^0.25.00.27.1out of date
 tera^1.19.01.20.0up to date
 tokio^1.28.21.45.1up to date
 tonic^0.9.20.13.1out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.41up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.19up to date

Build dependencies

(1 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tonic-build^0.9.20.13.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts

RUSTSEC-2024-0363

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:

SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)

Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.

It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163

This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.

Mitigation

As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.

Encode::size_hint() can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.

For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.

Resolution

sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23

Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901

MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.