Version 0.6.0 of the simple_asn1 crate panics on certain malformed inputs to its parsing functions, including from_der and der_decode. Because this crate is frequently used with inputs from the network, this should be considered a security vulnerability.

The issue occurs when parsing the old ASN.1 "UTCTime" time format. If an attacker provides a UTCTime where the first character is ASCII but the second character is above 0x7f, a string slice operation in the from_der_ function will try to slice into the middle of a UTF-8 character, and cause a panic.

This error was introduced in commit d7d39d709577710e9dc8, which updated simple_asn1 to use time instead of chrono because of RUSTSEC-2020-159. Versions of simple_asn1 before 0.6.0 are not affected by this issue.

The patch was applied in simple_asn1 version 0.6.1.

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.