This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tame-index

Dependencies

(19 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.111.11.1maybe insecure
 camino^1.11.2.2up to date
 crossbeam-channel^0.50.5.15up to date
 home^0.50.5.12up to date
 http^1.31.4.0up to date
 memchr^2.52.8.0up to date
 rayon^1.71.11.0up to date
 rustc-stable-hash^0.10.1.2up to date
 semver^1.01.0.27up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 smol_str^0.30.3.5up to date
 thiserror^2.02.0.18up to date
 tokio^1.481.49.0up to date
 toml-span^0.60.7.0out of date
 twox-hash^2.12.1.2up to date
 reqwest^0.130.13.2up to date
 libc^0.20.2.182up to date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cargo_metadata^0.230.23.1up to date
 rayon^1.71.11.0up to date
 reqwest^0.130.13.2up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.230.23.36maybe insecure
 tempfile^3.153.25.0up to date
 tiny-bench^0.40.4.0up to date
 webpki-roots^1.01.0.6up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.