This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate httprs

Dependencies

(22 total, 2 outdated, 4 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tokio^1.451.50.0up to date
 hyper^11.8.1up to date
 http-body-util^0.10.1.3up to date
 hyper-util^0.10.1.20up to date
 walkdir^22.5.0up to date
 clap^44.6.0up to date
 colored^33.1.1up to date
 toml^0.81.0.6+spec-1.1.0out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.30.3.23maybe insecure
 bytes ⚠️^1.101.11.1maybe insecure
 urlencoding^22.1.3up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.32up to date
 regex^1.91.12.3up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 lazy_static^11.5.0up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.230.23.37maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.4up to date
 netdev^0.350.40.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

tracing-subscriber: Logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences

RUSTSEC-2025-0055

Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:

  • Manipulate terminal title bars
  • Clear screens or modify terminal display
  • Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation

In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.

This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.