This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate trust-dns-resolver


(22 total, 1 outdated, 2 insecure)

 cfg-if^ to date
 lazy_static^ to date
 log^ to date
 lru-cache^ to date
 parking_lot^ to date
 resolv-conf^ to date
 rustls^ to date
 serde^ to date
 thiserror^ to date
 tokio^ to date
 tokio-native-tls^ to date
 tokio-openssl^ to date
 tokio-rustls^ to date
 trust-dns-https^ to date
 trust-dns-native-tls^ to date
 trust-dns-openssl^ to date
 trust-dns-proto^ to date
 trust-dns-rustls^ to date
 webpki-roots^ of date
 ipconfig^ to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

 env_logger^ to date
 futures-executor^ to date

Security Vulnerabilities

futures-util: MutexGuard::map can cause a data race in safe code


Affected versions of the crate had a Send/Sync implementation for MappedMutexGuard that only considered variance on T, while MappedMutexGuard dereferenced to U.

This could of led to data races in safe Rust code when a closure used in MutexGuard::map() returns U that is unrelated to T.

The issue was fixed by fixing Send and Sync implementations, and by adding a PhantomData<&'a mut U> marker to the MappedMutexGuard type to tell the compiler that the guard is over U too.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many


A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.