This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tonic

Dependencies

(23 total, 11 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-stream^0.30.3.6up to date
 async-trait^0.1.130.1.83up to date
 base64^0.130.22.1out of date
 bytes^1.01.8.0up to date
 futures-core^0.30.3.31up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.31up to date
 h2 ⚠️^0.30.4.6out of date
 http^0.21.1.0out of date
 http-body^0.41.0.1out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.14.21.5.0out of date
 percent-encoding^2.12.3.1up to date
 pin-project^1.01.1.7up to date
 prost-derive^0.70.13.3out of date
 prost^0.70.13.3out of date
 rustls-native-certs^0.50.8.0out of date
 tokio ⚠️^1.0.11.41.1maybe insecure
 tokio-rustls^0.220.26.0out of date
 tokio-stream^0.10.1.16up to date
 tokio-util^0.60.7.12out of date
 tower^0.4.70.5.1out of date
 tower-service^0.30.3.3up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.40up to date
 tracing-futures^0.20.2.5up to date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bencher^0.1.50.1.5up to date
 quickcheck^1.01.0.3up to date
 quickcheck_macros^1.01.0.0up to date
 rand^0.80.8.5up to date
 static_assertions^1.01.1.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.01.41.1maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

h2: Degradation of service in h2 servers with CONTINUATION Flood

RUSTSEC-2024-0332

An attacker can send a flood of CONTINUATION frames, causing h2 to process them indefinitely. This results in an increase in CPU usage.

Tokio task budget helps prevent this from a complete denial-of-service, as the server can still respond to legitimate requests, albeit with increased latency.

More details at "https://seanmonstar.com/blog/hyper-http2-continuation-flood/.

Patches available for 0.4.x and 0.3.x versions.