HeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity. However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number in release mode.

If the map was not empty when the overflow happens, the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing. This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve() to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

Affected versions of this crate incorrectly used raw pointer, which introduced unsoundness in its public safe API.

Failing to drop the Drain struct causes double-free, and it is possible to violate Rust's alias rule and cause data race with Drain's Iterator implementation.

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

Affected versions of this crate contained a bug in which decoding untrusted input could overflow the stack.

On architectures with stack probes (like x86), this can be used for denial of service attacks, while on architectures without stack probes (like ARM) overflowing the stack is unsound and can result in potential memory corruption (or even RCE).

The flaw was quickly corrected by @danburkert and released in version 0.6.1.

hyper's HTTP server code had a flaw that incorrectly understands some requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers to have a chunked payload, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that understands the request payload boundary differently can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks".

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

When this function was passed an empty string, openssl would attempt to call strlen on it, reading arbitrary memory until it reached a NUL byte.