This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tokio-postgres

Dependencies

(18 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 byteorder^1.01.5.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.01.11.1maybe insecure
 fallible-iterator^0.20.3.0out of date
 futures-channel^0.30.3.31up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.31up to date
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 parking_lot^0.120.12.5up to date
 percent-encoding^2.02.3.2up to date
 phf^0.110.13.1out of date
 pin-project-lite^0.20.2.16up to date
 postgres-protocol^0.6.80.6.10up to date
 postgres-types^0.2.90.2.12up to date
 rand^0.9.00.10.0out of date
 socket2^0.50.6.2out of date
 tokio^1.271.49.0up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 whoami ⚠️^1.4.12.1.0out of date

Dev dependencies

(14 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bit-vec^0.60.8.0out of date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.43maybe insecure
 criterion^0.50.8.2out of date
 env_logger^0.110.11.8up to date
 eui48^1.01.1.0up to date
 futures-executor^0.30.3.31up to date
 geo-types^0.70.7.18up to date
 jiff^0.10.2.19out of date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 smol_str^0.10.3.5out of date
 time^0.30.3.47up to date
 tokio ⚠️^1.01.49.0maybe insecure
 uuid^1.01.20.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

whoami: Stack buffer overflow with whoami on several Unix platforms

RUSTSEC-2024-0020

With versions of the whoami crate >= 0.5.3 and < 1.5.0, calling any of these functions leads to an immediate stack buffer overflow on illumos and Solaris:

  • whoami::username
  • whoami::realname
  • whoami::username_os
  • whoami::realname_os

With versions of the whoami crate >= 0.5.3 and < 1.0.1, calling any of the above functions also leads to a stack buffer overflow on these platforms:

  • Bitrig
  • DragonFlyBSD
  • FreeBSD
  • NetBSD
  • OpenBSD

This occurs because of an incorrect definition of the passwd struct on those platforms.

As a result of this issue, denial of service and data corruption have both been observed in the wild. The issue is possibly exploitable as well.

This vulnerability also affects other Unix platforms that aren't Linux or macOS.

This issue has been addressed in whoami 1.5.0.

For more information, see this GitHub issue.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.