This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
postgres-types(16 total, 4 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| array-init | ^2 | 2.1.0 | up to date |
| bit-vec | ^0.6 | 0.9.1 | out of date |
| bytes ⚠️ | ^1.0 | 1.11.1 | maybe insecure |
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4.16 | 0.4.44 | maybe insecure |
| cidr | ^0.3 | 0.3.2 | up to date |
| eui48 | ^1.0 | 1.1.0 | up to date |
| fallible-iterator | ^0.2 | 0.3.0 | out of date |
| geo-types | ^0.7 | 0.7.18 | up to date |
| jiff | ^0.1 | 0.2.23 | out of date |
| postgres-derive | ^0.4.6 | 0.4.7 | up to date |
| postgres-protocol | ^0.6.8 | 0.6.10 | up to date |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.228 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.149 | up to date |
| smol_str | ^0.1.23 | 0.3.6 | out of date |
| time ⚠️ | ^0.3 | 0.3.47 | maybe insecure |
| uuid | ^1.0 | 1.22.0 | up to date |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition
if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset
uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.
This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.
use bytes::*;
fn main() {
let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
let mut b = a.split_off(5);
// Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
drop(a);
// Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);
// This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
b.put_u8(b'h');
}
Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.
time: Denial of Service via Stack ExhaustionWhen user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.
Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.