This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate solana-signature

Dependencies

(9 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bs58^0.5.10.5.1up to date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️=1.0.12.1.1out of date
 rand^0.8.50.9.0out of date
 serde^1.0.2171.0.219up to date
 serde-big-array^0.5.10.5.1up to date
 serde_derive^1.0.2171.0.219up to date
 solana-frozen-abi^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-frozen-abi-macro^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-sanitize^2.2.12.2.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bincode^1.3.32.0.1out of date
 bs58^0.5.10.5.1up to date
 curve25519-dalek^4.1.34.1.3up to date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️=1.0.12.1.1out of date
 serde_derive^1.0.2171.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.0.1371.0.140up to date
 solana-pubkey^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-short-vec^2.2.12.2.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.