This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate solana-keypair

Dependencies

(11 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bs58^0.5.10.5.1up to date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️=1.0.12.1.1out of date
 ed25519-dalek-bip32^0.2.00.3.0out of date
 rand^0.70.9.0out of date
 solana-derivation-path^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-pubkey^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-seed-derivable^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-seed-phrase^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-signature^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-signer^2.2.12.2.1up to date
 wasm-bindgen^0.20.2.100up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^1.0.1371.0.140up to date
 static_assertions^1.1.01.1.0up to date
 tiny-bip39^0.8.22.0.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.