This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate solana-crate-features

Dependencies

(16 total, 8 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 backtrace^0.3.330.3.71up to date
 bytes^0.4.121.6.0out of date
 cc^1.0.451.0.98up to date
 curve25519-dalek^1.1.34.1.2out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^1.0.0-pre.12.1.1out of date
 either^1.5.21.12.0up to date
 failure^0.1.50.1.8up to date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.4.0up to date
 libc^0.2.620.2.155up to date
 rand_chacha^0.1.10.3.1out of date
 regex-syntax^0.6.120.8.3out of date
 reqwest^0.9.200.12.4out of date
 serde^1.0.1001.0.202up to date
 syn^1.0.32.0.65out of date
 tokio ⚠️^0.1.221.37.0out of date
 winapi^0.3.80.3.9up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.