This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
sea-query-binder(10 total, 4 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| bigdecimal | ^0.3 | 0.4.10 | out of date |
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4 | 0.4.44 | maybe insecure |
| ipnetwork | ^0.20 | 0.21.1 | out of date |
| mac_address | ^1.1 | 1.1.8 | up to date |
| rust_decimal | ^1 | 1.40.0 | up to date |
| sea-query | ^0.31.0 | 0.32.7 | out of date |
| serde_json | ^1 | 1.0.149 | up to date |
| sqlx ⚠️ | <0.7.5 | 0.8.6 | out of date |
| time ⚠️ | ^0.3.36 | 0.3.47 | maybe insecure |
| uuid | ^1 | 1.22.0 | up to date |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing CastsThe following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:
SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)
Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.
It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163
This code has existed essentially since the beginning,
so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.
As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.
Encode::size_hint()
can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate.
For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size,
so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.
For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.
sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23
Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901
MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.
time: Denial of Service via Stack ExhaustionWhen user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.
Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.