This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
s3find(12 total, 7 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4 | 0.4.38 | maybe insecure |
| clap | ^2 | 4.5.4 | out of date |
| failure | ^0.1 | 0.1.8 | up to date |
| futures | ^0.1 | 0.3.30 | out of date |
| glob | ^0.3 | 0.3.1 | up to date |
| humansize | ^1 | 2.1.3 | out of date |
| indicatif | ^0.12 | 0.17.8 | out of date |
| regex ⚠️ | ^1 | 1.10.4 | maybe insecure |
| rusoto_core | ^0.40 | 0.48.0 | out of date |
| rusoto_credential | ^0.40 | 0.48.0 | out of date |
| rusoto_s3 | ^0.40 | 0.48.0 | out of date |
| structopt | ^0.3 | 0.3.26 | up to date |
(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| remove_dir_all ⚠️ | ^0.5 | 0.8.2 | out of date |
| tempfile | ^3 | 3.10.1 | up to date |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parseThe Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not
properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An
attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by
sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No
known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted
regexes.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability
is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses
of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.
The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service
attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted
regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent
attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's
API.
Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.
All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this
issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.
We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately
to the latest version of the regex crate.
Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.
We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.
We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.
remove_dir_all: Race Condition Enabling Link Following and Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU)The remove_dir_all crate is a Rust library that offers additional features over the Rust standard library fs::remove_dir_all function.
It was possible to trick a privileged process doing a recursive delete in an attacker controlled directory into deleting privileged files, on all operating systems.
For instance, consider deleting a tree called 'etc' in a parent directory
called 'p'. Between calling remove_dir_all("a") and remove_dir_all("a")
actually starting its work, the attacker can move 'p' to 'p-prime', and
replace 'p' with a symlink to '/'. Then the privileged process deletes 'p/etc'
which is actually /etc, and now your system is broken. There are some
mitigations for this exact scenario, such as CWD relative file lookup, but
they are not guaranteed - any code using absolute paths will not have that
protection in place.
The same attack could be performed at any point in the directory tree being deleted: if 'a' contains a child directory called 'etc', attacking the deletion by replacing 'a' with a link is possible.
The new code in this release mitigates the attack within the directory tree being deleted by using file-handle relative operations: to open 'a/etc', the path 'etc' relative to 'a' is opened, where 'a' is represented by a file descriptor (Unix) or handle (Windows). With the exception of the entry points into the directory deletion logic, this is robust against manipulation of the directory hierarchy, and remove_dir_all will only delete files and directories contained in the tree it is deleting.
The entry path however is a challenge - as described above, there are some potential mitigations, but since using them must be done by the calling code, it is hard to be confident about the security properties of the path based interface.
The new extension trait RemoveDir provides an interface where it is much
harder to get it wrong.
somedir.remove_dir_contents("name-of-child").
Callers can then make their own security evaluation about how to securely get
a directory handle. That is still not particularly obvious, and we're going to
follow up with a helper of some sort (probably in the fs_at crate). Once
that is available, the path based entry points will get deprecated.
In the interim, processes that might run with elevated privileges should
figure out how to securely identify the directory they are going to delete, to
avoid the initial race. Pragmatically, other processes should be fine with the
path based entry points : this is the same interface std::fs::remove_dir_all
offers, and an unprivileged process running in an attacker controlled
directory can't do anything that the attacker can't already do.