This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate s2n-quic

Dependencies

(20 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 cfg-if^11.0.4up to date
 cuckoofilter^0.50.5.0up to date
 futures^0.30.3.32up to date
 hash_hasher^22.0.4up to date
 humansize^22.1.3up to date
 rand^0.90.10.0out of date
 rand_chacha^0.90.10.0out of date
 s2n-codec=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-core=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-crypto=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-platform=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-rustls=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-tls=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-tls-default=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 s2n-quic-transport=0.75.00.75.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.49.0maybe insecure
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 zerocopy^0.80.8.39up to date
 zeroize^11.8.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bolero^0.130.13.4up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.49.0maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.