This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rkyv

Dependencies

(16 total, 1 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arrayvec^0.70.7.6up to date
 bytecheck^0.80.8.2up to date
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 hashbrown ⚠️^0.150.16.1out of date
 indexmap^22.13.0up to date
 munge^0.40.4.7up to date
 ptr_meta^0.30.3.1up to date
 rancor^0.10.1.1up to date
 rend^0.50.5.3up to date
 rkyv_derive=0.8.150.8.15up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^11.15.1maybe insecure
 smol_str^0.30.3.5up to date
 thin-vec^0.2.120.2.14up to date
 tinyvec^11.10.0up to date
 triomphe^0.10.1.15up to date
 uuid^11.20.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ahash^0.80.8.12up to date
 divan^0.10.1.21up to date
 rustversion^11.0.22up to date
 trybuild^11.0.115up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

hashbrown: Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

The borsh serialization of the HashMap did not follow the borsh specification. It potentially produced non-canonical encodings dependent on insertion order. It also did not perform canonicty checks on decoding.

This can result in consensus splits and cause equivalent objects to be considered distinct.

This was patched in 0.15.1.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.