This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
rcgen(6 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| pem | ^1.0 | 3.0.6 | out of date |
| ring ⚠️ | ^0.16 | 0.17.14 | out of date |
| time ⚠️ | ^0.3.6 | 0.3.47 | maybe insecure |
| x509-parser | ^0.14 | 0.18.1 | out of date |
| yasna | ^0.5 | 0.6.0 | out of date |
| zeroize | ^1.2 | 1.8.2 | up to date |
(6 total, 4 outdated, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| botan | ^0.8 | 0.12.0 | out of date |
| openssl ⚠️ | ^0.10 | 0.10.76 | maybe insecure |
| rand | ^0.8 | 0.10.0 | out of date |
| rsa ⚠️ | ^0.6 | 0.9.10 | insecure |
| webpki ⚠️ | ^0.22 | 0.22.4 | maybe insecure |
| x509-parser | ^0.14 | 0.18.1 | out of date |
webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path buildingWhen this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.
Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.
This was previously reported in https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.
webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.
rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannelsDue to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.
ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow
checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by
sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur
in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.
On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may
panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately
68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols
like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large
amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not
attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.
Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but
RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml
profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in
debug mode.
openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.
In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).
The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.
time: Denial of Service via Stack ExhaustionWhen user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.
Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.