This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate parry2d

Dependencies

(23 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 approx^0.50.5.1up to date
 arrayvec^0.70.7.6up to date
 bitflags^2.32.11.0up to date
 bytemuck^11.25.0up to date
 cust_core^0.10.1.1up to date
 downcast-rs^12.0.2out of date
 either^11.15.0up to date
 ena^0.14.30.14.4up to date
 indexmap^22.13.0up to date
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 nalgebra^0.330.34.1out of date
 num-derive^0.40.4.2up to date
 num-traits^0.20.2.19up to date
 ordered-float^45.1.0out of date
 rayon^11.11.0up to date
 rkyv ⚠️^0.7.410.8.15out of date
 rustc-hash^22.1.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 simba^0.90.9.1up to date
 slab^0.40.4.12up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^11.15.1maybe insecure
 spade^22.15.0up to date
 thiserror^12.0.18out of date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 macroquad^0.4.120.4.14up to date
 oorandom^1111.1.5up to date
 ptree^0.4.00.5.2out of date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 simba^0.90.9.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

rkyv: Potential Undefined Behaviors in `Arc<T>`/`Rc<T>` impls of `from_value` on OOM

RUSTSEC-2026-0001

The SharedPointer::alloc implementation for sync::Arc<T> and rc::Rc<T> in rkyv/src/impls/alloc/rc/atomic.rs (and rc.rs) does not check if the allocator returns a null pointer on OOM (Out of Memory).

This null pointer can flow through to SharedPointer::from_value, which calls Box::from_raw(ptr) with the null pointer. This triggers undefined behavior when utilizing safe deserialization APIs (such as rkyv::from_bytes or rkyv::deserialize_using) if an OOM condition occurs during the allocation of the shared pointer.

The issue is reachable through safe code and violates Rust's safety guarantees.