Deps.rs

openidconnect 4.0.0-alpha.2

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/openidconnect/4.0.0-alpha.2/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/openidconnect/4.0.0-alpha.2)

This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate openidconnect

Dependencies

(23 total, 10 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.210.23.1out of date
 chrono^0.40.4.45up to date
 dyn-clone^1.0.101.0.20up to date
 ed25519-dalek^2.0.03.0.0out of date
 hmac^0.12.10.13.0out of date
 http^1.01.5.0up to date
 itertools^0.100.15.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.34up to date
 oauth2=5.0.0-alpha.45.0.0out of date
 p256^0.13.20.14.0out of date
 p384^0.13.00.14.0out of date
 rand^0.8.50.10.2out of date
 rsa ⚠️^0.9.20.9.10insecure
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 serde-value^0.70.7.0up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.151up to date
 serde_path_to_error^0.10.1.20up to date
 serde_plain^1.01.0.2up to date
 serde_with^33.23.0up to date
 sha2^0.10.60.11.0out of date
 subtle^2.42.6.1up to date
 thiserror^1.02.0.20out of date
 url^2.42.5.8up to date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.01.0.104up to date
 color-backtrace^0.50.7.4out of date
 env_logger^0.90.11.11out of date
 pretty_assertions^1.01.4.1up to date
 reqwest^0.120.13.5out of date
 retry^1.02.2.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

rsa: Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels

RUSTSEC-2023-0071

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available. The crypto-bigint migration (RustCrypto/RSA#394) did not close this. Tracking is RustCrypto/RSA#626 (padding still not constant-time). Implicit rejection work is in RustCrypto/RSA#680; default-path blinding is in RustCrypto/RSA#702.

Still affected as of 2026-09-12: rsa 0.9.10 (latest stable) and rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 (latest). patched = [] is intentional.

Workarounds

Avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers can observe timing, for example over the network. Local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.