This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate mysql

Dependencies

(22 total, 8 outdated, 4 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bufstream~0.10.1.4up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.0.11.11.1maybe insecure
 crossbeam^0.8.10.8.4up to date
 flate2^1.01.1.9up to date
 io-enum^1.0.01.2.1up to date
 libc^0.20.2.183up to date
 lru ⚠️^0.70.16.3out of date
 mysql_common^0.28.00.37.0out of date
 named_pipe~0.40.4.1up to date
 native-tls^0.2.30.2.18up to date
 once_cell^1.7.21.21.4up to date
 pem^1.0.13.0.6out of date
 percent-encoding^2.1.02.3.2up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.20.00.23.37out of date
 rustls-pemfile^1.0.02.2.0out of date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 socket2^0.40.6.3out of date
 twox-hash^12.1.2out of date
 url^2.12.5.8up to date
 webpki ⚠️^0.22.00.22.4maybe insecure
 webpki-roots^0.22.11.0.6out of date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 frunk^0.40.4.4up to date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 rand^0.8.20.10.0out of date
 serde_derive^11.0.228up to date
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.47maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

lru: Use after free in lru crate

RUSTSEC-2021-0130

Lru crate has use after free vulnerability.

Lru crate has two functions for getting an iterator. Both iterators give references to key and value. Calling specific functions, like pop(), will remove and free the value, and but it's still possible to access the reference of value which is already dropped causing use after free.

webpki: webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building

RUSTSEC-2023-0052

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

This was previously reported in https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported recently by Luke Malinowski.

webpki 0.22.1 included a partial fix and webpki 0.22.2 added further fixes.

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.