This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate multipart


(17 total, 5 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

 buf_redux^ to date
 clippy>=0.0, < to date
 httparse^ to date
 hyper ⚠️>=0.9, < of date
 iron>=0.4, < to date
 lazy_static^ to date
 log^ to date
 mime^ to date
 mime_guess^ to date
 nickel>= to date
 quick-error^ of date
 rand^ of date
 rocket ⚠️^ insecure
 safemem^ to date
 tempfile^33.2.0up to date
 tiny_http ⚠️^ of date
 twoway^ of date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, 1 outdated)

 env_logger^ of date

Security Vulnerabilities

tiny_http: HTTP Request smuggling through malformed Transfer Encoding headers


HTTP pipelining issues and request smuggling attacks are possible due to incorrect Transfer encoding header parsing.

It is possible conduct HTTP request smuggling attacks (CL:TE/TE:TE) by sending invalid Transfer Encoding headers.

By manipulating the HTTP response the attacker could poison a web-cache, perform an XSS attack, or obtain sensitive information from requests other than their own.

rocket: Use after free possible in `uri::Formatter` on panic


Affected versions of this crate transmuted a &str to a &'static str before pushing it into a StackVec, this value was then popped later in the same function.

This was assumed to be safe because the reference would be valid while the method's stack was active. In between the push and the pop, however, a function f was called that could invoke a user provided function.

If the user provided panicked, then the assumption used by the function was no longer true and the transmute to &'static would create an illegal static reference to the string. This could result in a freed string being used during (such as in a Drop implementation) or after (e.g through catch_unwind) the panic unwinding.

This flaw was corrected in commit e325e2f by using a guard object to ensure that the &'static str was dropped inside the function.

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling


hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss


When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.