This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate libp2p-noise

Dependencies

(18 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 asynchronous-codec^0.7.00.7.0up to date
 bytes^11.9.0up to date
 curve25519-dalek ⚠️^4.1.24.1.3maybe insecure
 futures^0.3.300.3.31up to date
 libp2p-core^0.42.00.42.0up to date
 libp2p-identity^0.2.90.2.10up to date
 multiaddr^0.18.10.18.2up to date
 multihash^0.19.10.19.3up to date
 once_cell^1.19.01.20.2up to date
 quick-protobuf^0.80.8.1up to date
 rand^0.8.30.8.5up to date
 sha2^0.10.80.10.8up to date
 snow^0.9.60.9.6up to date
 static_assertions^11.1.0up to date
 thiserror^1.0.612.0.7out of date
 tracing^0.1.370.1.41up to date
 x25519-dalek^22.0.1up to date
 zeroize^11.8.1up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures_ringbuf^0.4.00.4.0up to date
 libp2p-identity^0.2.90.2.10up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.19up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

curve25519-dalek: Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner [email protected] and Lea Themint [email protected] using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA