This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate iroh-relay

Dependencies

(50 total, 21 outdated, 3 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.104up to date
 bytes^1.71.12.2up to date
 clap^44.6.9up to date
 dashmap^6.1.06.2.1up to date
 data-encoding^2.6.02.11.1up to date
 derive_more^1.0.02.1.1out of date
 governor^0.7.00.10.4out of date
 hickory-proto ⚠️=0.25.0-alpha.50.26.3insecure
 hickory-resolver ⚠️=0.25.0-alpha.50.26.3insecure
 http^11.5.0up to date
 http-body-util^0.1.00.1.5up to date
 hyper^11.12.0up to date
 hyper-util^0.1.10.1.21up to date
 iroh-base^0.33.01.5.0out of date
 iroh-metrics^0.311.0.3out of date
 lru^0.120.19.1out of date
 n0-future^0.1.20.3.2out of date
 num_enum^0.70.7.6up to date
 pin-project^11.2.0up to date
 pkarr^29.0.0out of date
 postcard^11.2.0up to date
 iroh-quinn^0.13.00.16.1out of date
 iroh-quinn-proto^0.13.00.15.1out of date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 rcgen^0.130.14.10out of date
 regex^1.7.11.13.2up to date
 reloadable-state^0.10.1.0up to date
 reqwest^0.120.13.5out of date
 rustls^0.230.23.46up to date
 rustls-cert-file-reader^0.4.10.4.2up to date
 rustls-cert-reloadable-resolver^0.7.10.7.1up to date
 rustls-pemfile^2.12.2.0up to date
 serde^11.0.229up to date
 strum^0.260.28.0out of date
 stun-rs^0.1.50.1.11up to date
 thiserror^22.0.21up to date
 time^0.3.370.3.55up to date
 tokio^11.54.1up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.6up to date
 tokio-rustls-acme^0.60.10.0out of date
 tokio-tungstenite^0.240.30.0out of date
 tokio-tungstenite-wasm^0.40.9.0out of date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.20up to date
 toml^0.81.2.2+spec-1.1.0out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date
 url^2.52.5.9up to date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.1020.103.17insecure
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.12out of date
 z32^1.0.31.3.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 clap^44.6.9up to date
 crypto_box^0.9.10.9.1up to date
 proptest^1.2.01.12.0up to date
 rand_chacha^0.3.10.10.0out of date
 serde_json^11.0.154up to date
 testresult^0.4.00.4.2up to date
 tokio^11.54.1up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date
 tracing-test^0.2.50.2.6up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls-webpki: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic

RUSTSEC-2026-0049

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted

RUSTSEC-2026-0098

Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.

Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name

RUSTSEC-2026-0099

Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.

This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing

RUSTSEC-2026-0104

A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der] or [OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty BIT STRING appearing in the onlySomeReasons element of a IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.

This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.

Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.

Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.

hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses

RUSTSEC-2026-0118

The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in hickory-proto's DnssecDnsHandle walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never terminates, repeatedly calling Name::base_name() and pushing newly allocated Name and hashed-name entries into the candidate Vec.

The bug is reachable by any caller of DnssecDnsHandle — including the resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3 validation.

A debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root()) guards the loop body, so debug builds abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or exhaust memory on a release-built one.

The affected code was migrated from hickory-proto to hickory-net as part of the 0.26.0 release. The hickory-proto 0.26.x release no longer offers DnssecDnsHandle and so we recommend all affected users update to hickory-net 0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.

hickory-proto: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression

RUSTSEC-2026-0119

During message encoding, hickory-proto's BinEncoder stores pointers to labels that are candidates for name compression in a Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>. The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.

A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks.

This is similar to CVE-2024-8508.

We recommend all affected users update to hickory-proto 0.26.1 for the fix.

rustls-webpki: Certificate verification may accept distrusted intermediates

RUSTSEC-2026-0382

Affected versions may accept certificate paths containing distrusted emSign intermediate public keys when the configured trust anchors allow such paths. The private keys corresponding to these intermediates are now well known.

Versions 0.103.16 and 0.104.0-alpha.8 reject paths containing these public keys.

hickory-proto: Panic on a malformed `alpn` value when parsing SVCB or HTTPS records from text

RUSTSEC-2026-0487

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, the alpn service parameter value is split into a list of protocol names. That step called expect on the result, on the assumption that it could not fail. A malformed value, such as one with an unbalanced quote (alpn="h), two commas in a row or an invalid escape, makes it fail, so the parser panicked instead of returning an error.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix returns a parse error instead. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Panic when an SVCB or HTTPS parameter value is a single quote character

RUSTSEC-2026-0489

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, surrounding double quotes are removed from each service parameter value by checking that the value starts and ends with " and slicing off the first and last character. A value that is a single " (for example alpn=") passes that check, and the slice [1..0] panics.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix rejects a lone quote character with a parse error before the slice. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Zone file lexer panics on a token of 4096 or more characters

RUSTSEC-2026-0490

The zone file lexer read each token in a loop capped at 4,096 iterations, with an assert! on the loop counter as a safety bound. A single token long enough to reach that bound, for example a very long name or character string in a zone file, triggered the assertion and the parser panicked instead of returning the token or an error.

Code that parses zone files from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service.

The fix removes the iteration bound, so the lexer ends only when it reaches the end of a token or an error. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Memory amplification from record counts in the DNS message header

RUSTSEC-2026-0491

When a DNS message is decoded, the vectors for the question, answer, authority and additional sections were created with Vec::with_capacity set to the counts in the message header. Those counts come from the sender and are not checked against the size of the message, so a single small packet that claims 65,535 records makes the decoder reserve memory for that many records (about 18 MB, according to the upstream advisory) before it reads any record and fails.

Any code that decodes untrusted DNS messages is exposed. That includes servers, and clients and resolvers that receive spoofed responses. Repeated packets can drive memory use up and cause a denial of service.

The fix caps the initial capacity at 8 entries and lets the vectors grow as records are actually decoded. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: NSEC3 owner names not checked against the zone in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0505

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0511

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0512

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-resolver: `Resolver::lookup` and `lookup_ip` returned records that failed DNSSEC validation

RUSTSEC-2026-0514

With DNSSEC validation enabled, Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() returned Ok with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves.

Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic.

From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (DnsError::DnssecBogus), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

hickory-proto: Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0530

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Child-side NSEC or NSEC3 record accepted as proof that a delegation has no DS record (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0531

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted an NSEC or NSEC3 record from the child side of a zone cut, which has the SOA bit set, as proof that the parent has no DS record for the delegation (RFC 4035 section 5.2, RFC 6840 section 4.4). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could make a secure delegation look insecure and then forge records in the child zone.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: NSEC3 NODATA at a zone apex accepted without an NSEC3 record matching the query name (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0549

In hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, NSEC3 NODATA validation returned a secure result for a query at the zone apex even when no NSEC3 record in the response matched the hash of the query name, which RFC 5155 section 8.5 requires. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay any genuine signed NSEC3 record from the zone with the zone's signed SOA record and get a denial of any record type at the apex accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 or 0.26.0-alpha.1 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0551

Before 0.26.0-beta.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation ignored the DNS class when grouping records into RRsets and left records of a class other than IN out of signature checking, then marked them secure if the IN records validated. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could add forged records of another class, including a DS record, and have them returned as validated.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.