This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate hyper-http-proxy

Dependencies

(15 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.51.12.1maybe insecure
 futures-util^0.30.3.34up to date
 headers^0.40.4.1up to date
 http^11.5.0up to date
 hyper^11.11.1up to date
 hyper-rustls^0.270.27.9up to date
 hyper-tls^0.60.6.0up to date
 hyper-util^0.10.1.20up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.18up to date
 pin-project-lite^0.20.2.17up to date
 tokio^1.351.53.1up to date
 tokio-native-tls^0.30.3.1up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.260.26.5up to date
 tower-service^0.30.3.3up to date
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.9out of date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures^0.30.3.34up to date
 http-body-util^0.10.1.5up to date
 hyper^1.01.11.1up to date
 hyper-util^0.10.1.20up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.230.23.44maybe insecure
 tokio^1.351.53.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.