This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate hickory-resolver

Dependencies

(21 total, 8 outdated, 3 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 backtrace^0.3.500.3.77up to date
 cfg-if^11.0.5up to date
 futures-util^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 hickory-proto ⚠️^0.24.00.26.3insecure
 ipconfig^0.3.00.3.4up to date
 lru-cache^0.1.20.1.2up to date
 once_cell^1.18.01.21.4up to date
 parking_lot^0.120.13.0out of date
 rand^0.80.10.4out of date
 resolv-conf^0.7.00.7.6up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.60.23.46insecure
 rustls-native-certs^0.6.30.8.5out of date
 serde^1.01.0.229up to date
 smallvec^1.61.16.6up to date
 thiserror^1.0.202.0.21out of date
 tokio^1.211.54.1up to date
 tokio-native-tls^0.3.00.3.1up to date
 tokio-openssl^0.6.00.6.5up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.24.00.26.6out of date
 tracing^0.1.300.1.44up to date
 webpki-roots ⚠️^0.25.01.0.12insecure

Dev dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures-executor^0.3.50.3.34up to date
 tokio^1.211.54.1up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hickory-proto: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression

RUSTSEC-2026-0119

During message encoding, hickory-proto's BinEncoder stores pointers to labels that are candidates for name compression in a Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>. The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.

A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks.

This is similar to CVE-2024-8508.

We recommend all affected users update to hickory-proto 0.26.1 for the fix.

rustls: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets

RUSTSEC-2026-0346

The Debug implementations of Tls12ClientSessionValue and Tls13ClientSessionValue were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.

Custom ClientSessionStore implementations that format these values with Debug (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of the logs. This conflicts with rustls's key-material redaction policy.

Ordinary connection and built-in session cache Debug output is redacted and is not affected.

rustls: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange

RUSTSEC-2026-0349

The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.

A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store.

The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

The following are not affected:

  • connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
  • clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
  • other server names.

This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.

webpki-roots: Bundled root certificates allow trust in distrusted emSign intermediates

RUSTSEC-2026-0381

Affected versions include emSign ECC Root CA - G3, which can allow certificate paths through distrusted emSign intermediates.

Affected versions may accept certificate paths containing distrusted emSign intermediate public keys. The private keys corresponding to these intermediates are now well known.

Version 1.0.10+ removes this root.

The webpki-roots 0.26.11 compatibility package contains no independent trust store and re-exports the roots from its separately resolved 1.x dependency. That parent dependency must resolve to 1.0.10 or newer; an older parent remains affected by this advisory.

hickory-proto: Panic on a malformed `alpn` value when parsing SVCB or HTTPS records from text

RUSTSEC-2026-0487

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, the alpn service parameter value is split into a list of protocol names. That step called expect on the result, on the assumption that it could not fail. A malformed value, such as one with an unbalanced quote (alpn="h), two commas in a row or an invalid escape, makes it fail, so the parser panicked instead of returning an error.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix returns a parse error instead. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Panic when an SVCB or HTTPS parameter value is a single quote character

RUSTSEC-2026-0489

When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, surrounding double quotes are removed from each service parameter value by checking that the value starts and ends with " and slicing off the first and last character. A value that is a single " (for example alpn=") passes that check, and the slice [1..0] panics.

Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.

The fix rejects a lone quote character with a parse error before the slice. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Zone file lexer panics on a token of 4096 or more characters

RUSTSEC-2026-0490

The zone file lexer read each token in a loop capped at 4,096 iterations, with an assert! on the loop counter as a safety bound. A single token long enough to reach that bound, for example a very long name or character string in a zone file, triggered the assertion and the parser panicked instead of returning the token or an error.

Code that parses zone files from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service.

The fix removes the iteration bound, so the lexer ends only when it reaches the end of a token or an error. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: Memory amplification from record counts in the DNS message header

RUSTSEC-2026-0491

When a DNS message is decoded, the vectors for the question, answer, authority and additional sections were created with Vec::with_capacity set to the counts in the message header. Those counts come from the sender and are not checked against the size of the message, so a single small packet that claims 65,535 records makes the decoder reserve memory for that many records (about 18 MB, according to the upstream advisory) before it reads any record and fails.

Any code that decodes untrusted DNS messages is exposed. That includes servers, and clients and resolvers that receive spoofed responses. Repeated packets can drive memory use up and cause a denial of service.

The fix caps the initial capacity at 8 entries and lets the vectors grow as records are actually decoded. It is in 0.26.2.

hickory-proto: NSEC3 owner names not checked against the zone in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0505

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0511

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0512

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0530

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Child-side NSEC or NSEC3 record accepted as proof that a delegation has no DS record (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0531

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted an NSEC or NSEC3 record from the child side of a zone cut, which has the SOA bit set, as proof that the parent has no DS record for the delegation (RFC 4035 section 5.2, RFC 6840 section 4.4). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could make a secure delegation look insecure and then forge records in the child zone.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

hickory-proto: Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated (hickory-proto)

RUSTSEC-2026-0551

Before 0.26.0-beta.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation ignored the DNS class when grouping records into RRsets and left records of a class other than IN out of signature checking, then marked them secure if the IN records validated. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could add forged records of another class, including a DS record, and have them returned as validated.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.