This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate fred

Dependencies

(30 total, 9 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arc-swap^1.61.8.2up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.51.11.1maybe insecure
 bytes-utils^0.10.1.4up to date
 crossbeam-queue^0.30.3.12up to date
 float-cmp^0.90.10.0out of date
 futures^0.30.3.32up to date
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.18up to date
 nom^7.18.0.0out of date
 parking_lot^0.120.12.5up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 redis-protocol^4.16.0.0out of date
 rustls ⚠️^0.22.10.23.37out of date
 rustls-native-certs^0.7.00.8.3out of date
 semver^1.01.0.27up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 sha-1^0.100.10.1up to date
 socket2^0.50.6.3out of date
 tokio^1.341.50.0up to date
 tokio-native-tls^0.30.3.1up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.25.00.26.4out of date
 tokio-stream^0.10.1.18up to date
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-futures^0.20.2.5up to date
 trust-dns-resolver^0.230.23.2up to date
 url^2.42.5.8up to date
 urlencoding^2.12.1.3up to date
 rustls-webpki^0.102.00.103.9out of date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 axum^0.70.8.8out of date
 base64^0.22.00.22.1up to date
 bollard^0.150.20.1out of date
 pretty_env_logger^0.50.5.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 subprocess^0.21.0.0out of date
 tokio-stream^0.10.1.18up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.