If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.

Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.

This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der] or [OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty BIT STRING appearing in the onlySomeReasons element of a IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.

This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.

Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.

Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.