This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
finchers-tungstenite(8 total, 6 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| base64 | ^0.9.3 | 0.22.0 | out of date |
| failure | ^0.1.2 | 0.1.8 | up to date |
| finchers | ^0.13 | 0.13.5 | up to date |
| futures | ^0.1.24 | 0.3.30 | out of date |
| http ⚠️ | ^0.1.13 | 1.1.0 | out of date |
| sha1 | ^0.6.0 | 0.10.6 | out of date |
| tokio-tungstenite | ^0.6.0 | 0.21.0 | out of date |
| tungstenite ⚠️ | ^0.6.0 | 0.21.0 | out of date |
(3 total, 1 outdated)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| log | ^0.4.5 | 0.4.21 | up to date |
| matches | ^0.1.8 | 0.1.10 | up to date |
| pretty_env_logger | ^0.2.4 | 0.5.0 | out of date |
http: Integer Overflow in HeaderMap::reserve() can cause Denial of ServiceHeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity.
However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number
in release mode.
If the map was not empty when the overflow happens,
the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing.
This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve()
to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
http: HeaderMap::Drain API is unsoundAffected versions of this crate incorrectly used raw pointer, which introduced unsoundness in its public safe API.
Failing to drop the Drain struct causes double-free, and it is possible to violate Rust's alias rule and cause data race with Drain's Iterator implementation.
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
tungstenite: Tungstenite allows remote attackers to cause a denial of serviceThe Tungstenite crate through 0.20.0 for Rust allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (minutes of CPU consumption) via an excessive length of an HTTP header in a client handshake. The length affects both how many times a parse is attempted (e.g., thousands of times) and the average amount of data for each parse attempt (e.g., millions of bytes).