This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate facet-core

Dependencies

(25 total, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.11.01.11.1maybe insecure
 bytestring^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 camino^1.2.11.2.2up to date
 chrono^0.4.420.4.44up to date
 compact_str^0.9.00.9.0up to date
 const-fnv1a-hash^11.1.0up to date
 iddqd^0.30.3.17up to date
 impls^11.0.3up to date
 indexmap^2.12.12.13.0up to date
 jiff^0.2.160.2.23up to date
 lock_api^0.40.4.14up to date
 num-complex^0.4.60.4.6up to date
 ordered-float^5.0.05.3.0up to date
 ruint ⚠️^1.17.01.17.2maybe insecure
 rust_decimal^1.38.01.41.0up to date
 smallvec^1.151.15.1up to date
 smartstring^1.0.11.0.1up to date
 smol_str^0.3.40.3.6up to date
 stable_deref_trait^1.2.11.2.1up to date
 tendril^0.5.00.5.0up to date
 time ⚠️^0.3.440.3.47maybe insecure
 ulid^1.2.11.2.1up to date
 url^2.5.42.5.8up to date
 uuid^1.19.01.23.0up to date
 yoke^0.8.10.8.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 parking_lot^0.120.12.5up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ruint: Unsoundness of safe `reciprocal_mg10`

RUSTSEC-2025-0137

The function reciprocal_mg10 is marked as safe but can trigger undefined behavior (out-of-bounds access) because it relies on debug_assert! for safety checks instead of assert!.

When compiled in release mode, the debug_assert! is optimized out, potentially allowing invalid inputs to cause memory corruption.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.