This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate ethers-core

Dependencies

(22 total, 6 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arrayvec^0.70.7.6up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.41.11.1maybe insecure
 cargo_metadata^0.18.00.23.1out of date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 elliptic-curve^0.13.50.13.8up to date
 ethabi^18.0.018.0.0up to date
 generic-array^0.14.71.3.5out of date
 const-hex^1.61.18.1up to date
 k256^0.13.10.13.4up to date
 num_enum^0.70.7.6up to date
 once_cell^1.181.21.4up to date
 open-fastrlp^0.1.40.1.4up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 rlp^0.50.6.1out of date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 strum^0.26.10.28.0out of date
 syn^2.02.0.117up to date
 tempfile^3.83.27.0up to date
 thiserror^1.02.0.18out of date
 tiny-keccak^2.0.22.0.2up to date
 unicode-xid^0.20.2.6up to date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bincode^1.3.33.0.0out of date
 hex-literal^0.41.1.0out of date
 once_cell^1.181.21.4up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.