This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate duckdb

Dependencies

(19 total, 8 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arrow^5660.2.0out of date
 calamine ⚠️^0.28.00.38.0insecure
 cast^0.30.3.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.220.4.45up to date
 duckdb-loadable-macros=0.1.151.20001.0out of date
 fallible-iterator^0.30.3.0up to date
 fallible-streaming-iterator^0.10.1.9up to date
 hashlink^0.100.12.2out of date
 libduckdb-sys=1.4.51.20001.0out of date
 num^0.40.4.3up to date
 num-integer^0.1.460.1.47up to date
 polars^0.49.10.55.2out of date
 polars-arrow^0.49.10.55.2out of date
 r2d2^0.8.90.8.10up to date
 rust_decimal^1.141.43.0up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.154up to date
 strum^0.270.28.0out of date
 url^2.12.5.9up to date
 uuid^1.01.29.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 doc-comment^0.30.3.4up to date
 polars-core^0.49.10.55.2out of date
 pretty_assertions^1.4.11.4.1up to date
 rand^0.9.00.10.4out of date
 rustyline^1519.0.0out of date
 tempfile^3.1.03.27.0up to date
 uuid^1.01.29.3up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

calamine: Panic and unbounded allocation (OOM) in the CFB/OLE2 parser on malformed input

RUSTSEC-2026-0436

The Compound File Binary (OLE2) parser (src/cfb.rs), used when reading .xls and .xlsb workbooks and when extracting VBA projects from .xlsx, can panic or allocate without bound on crafted input. Both are reachable through the public reader API (open_workbook, Xls::new, Xlsb::new) on an attacker-supplied file. Impact is denial of service only — no memory unsafety (safe Rust turns the out-of-bounds read into a bounds-checked panic).

  1. Reachable panic (out-of-bounds slice index). The directory stream is iterated with .chunks(128), but Directory::from_slice reads fixed offsets (buf[..64], buf[116..120], buf[120..128]) without checking the chunk length. A directory stream whose length is not a multiple of 128 yields a short final chunk, causing a panic (range end index 64 out of range for slice of length N). SectorSize::Small 64-byte mini sectors are a second trigger.

  2. Unbounded allocation / OOM. The DIFAT loader grows the difat vector without bounding the number of iterations; a crafted self-referential DIFAT chain drives a multi-gigabyte allocation from a tiny file (a 512-byte file attempts an allocation of several gigabytes).

A consumer that parses untrusted or user-supplied spreadsheets can be crashed (thread panic, or process abort under panic=abort) or driven out of memory by a small crafted file.

Fixed in calamine 0.38.0 (commit b8ec4f0); the maintainer confirmed the fix in https://github.com/tafia/calamine/pull/762.