This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate deno_core

Dependencies

(24 total, 8 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.102up to date
 bincode^13.0.0out of date
 bit-set^0.5.30.9.1out of date
 bit-vec^0.6.30.9.1out of date
 bytes ⚠️>=1.6.01.11.1maybe insecure
 cooked-waker^55.0.0up to date
 deno_core_icudata^0.0.730.77.0out of date
 deno_ops^0.194.00.267.0out of date
 deno_unsync^0.4.00.4.4up to date
 futures^0.3.210.3.32up to date
 libc^0.2.1260.2.183up to date
 memoffset>=0.90.9.1up to date
 parking_lot^0.12.00.12.5up to date
 percent-encoding^2.3.02.3.2up to date
 pin-project^11.1.11up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 serde_v8^0.227.00.300.0out of date
 smallvec^1.81.15.1up to date
 sourcemap^89.3.2out of date
 static_assertions^11.1.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.50.0maybe insecure
 url^22.5.8up to date
 v8^0.106.0146.4.0out of date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bencher^0.10.1.5up to date
 criterion^0.50.8.2out of date
 deno_ast=0.40.00.53.1out of date
 fastrand^22.3.0up to date
 pretty_assertions^1.3.01.4.1up to date
 rstest^00.26.1up to date
 twox-hash^2.0.02.1.2up to date
 unicycle ⚠️^00.10.2maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

unicycle: PinSlab<T> and Unordered<T, S> need bounds on their Send/Sync traits

RUSTSEC-2020-0116

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implemented Send & Sync for types PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>. This allows sending non-Send types to other threads and concurrently accessing non-Sync types from multiple threads.

This can result in a data race & memory corruption when types that provide internal mutability without synchronization are contained within PinSlab<T> or Unordered<T, S> and accessed concurrently from multiple threads.

The flaw was corrected in commits 92f40b4 & 6a6c367 by adding trait bound T: Send to Send impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S> and adding T: Sync to Sync impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.