This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate axum_typed_multipart

Dependencies

(13 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.0.721.0.101up to date
 async-trait^0.1.840.1.89up to date
 axum^0.8.10.8.8up to date
 axum_typed_multipart_macros^0.16.50.16.5up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.7.11.11.1maybe insecure
 chrono ⚠️^0.4.00.4.43maybe insecure
 futures-core^0.3.310.3.31up to date
 futures-util^0.3.310.3.31up to date
 rust_decimal^1.20.01.40.0up to date
 tempfile^3.1.03.24.0up to date
 thiserror^2.0.02.0.18up to date
 tokio^1.25.01.49.0up to date
 uuid^1.0.01.20.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(6 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 axum^0.8.10.8.8up to date
 reqwest^0.12.120.13.2out of date
 serde^1.0.1931.0.228up to date
 tokio^1.25.01.49.0up to date
 utoipa^5.3.15.4.0up to date
 utoipa-rapidoc^6.0.06.0.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.