This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate alloy-transport-ipc

Dependencies

(13 total, 3 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 alloy-json-rpc^0.91.6.3out of date
 alloy-pubsub^0.91.6.3out of date
 alloy-transport^0.91.6.3out of date
 bytes ⚠️^1.5.01.11.1maybe insecure
 futures^0.30.3.31up to date
 interprocess^22.3.1up to date
 pin-project^1.11.1.10up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 tempfile^3.103.25.0up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.49.0maybe insecure
 tokio-util^0.70.7.18up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tokio-test^0.40.4.5up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.