This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate actix-http-test

Dependencies

(19 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-codec^0.4.10.5.2out of date
 actix-rt^2.22.10.0up to date
 actix-server^2.0.0-rc.22.5.1up to date
 actix-service^2.0.02.0.3up to date
 actix-tls^3.0.03.4.0up to date
 actix-utils^3.0.03.0.1up to date
 awc^3.0.0-beta.153.6.0up to date
 base64^0.130.22.1out of date
 bytes^11.10.1up to date
 futures-core^0.3.70.3.31up to date
 http^0.2.51.2.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.26up to date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 serde_urlencoded^0.70.7.1up to date
 slab^0.40.4.9up to date
 socket2^0.40.5.8out of date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.90.10.71maybe insecure
 tokio ⚠️^1.81.44.0maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

openssl: ssl::select_next_proto use after free

RUSTSEC-2025-0004

In openssl versions before 0.10.70, ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});