This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate vizia

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 fern^0.70.7.1up to date

Crate todo

No external dependencies! 🙌

Crate widget_gallery

Dependencies

(3 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 fern^0.70.7.1up to date
 log^0.4.190.4.29up to date
 chrono^0.4.340.4.44up to date

Crate gallery

Dependencies

(5 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tokio^1.43.01.49.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️*1.11.1maybe insecure
 image ⚠️*0.25.9maybe insecure
 serde*1.0.228up to date
 reqwest*0.13.2up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

image: Flaw in interface may drop uninitialized instance of arbitrary types

RUSTSEC-2019-0014

Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.

This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.

Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.

Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.