Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.

This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.

Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.

Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly check and cap the growth of the outgoing buffer.

This allows a remote attacker to take down the process by growing the buffer of their (single) connection until the process runs out of memory it can allocate and is killed.

The flaw was corrected in the parity-ws fork (>=0.10.0) by disconnecting a client when the buffer runs full.