This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate totebag

Dependencies

(25 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ar^0.9.00.9.0up to date
 bzip2^0.6.10.6.1up to date
 chrono^0.4.390.4.44up to date
 clap^4.5.274.6.0up to date
 kpea^0.2.50.3.0out of date
 cab^0.6.00.6.0up to date
 crc^3.43.4.0up to date
 delharc^0.6.10.6.1up to date
 env_logger^0.11.60.11.10up to date
 flate2^1.0.351.1.9up to date
 humansize^2.1.32.1.3up to date
 ignore^0.4.230.4.25up to date
 infer^0.19.00.19.0up to date
 log^0.4.250.4.29up to date
 serde^1.0.2281.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.0.1451.0.149up to date
 serde-xml-rs^0.8.10.8.2up to date
 sevenz-rust^0.6.00.6.1up to date
 tar ⚠️^0.4.430.4.45maybe insecure
 time ⚠️^0.3.370.3.47maybe insecure
 typed-builder^0.23.20.23.2up to date
 unrar^0.5.70.5.8up to date
 xz2^0.1.70.1.7up to date
 zip^6.0.08.5.0out of date
 zstd^0.13.20.13.3up to date

Crate totebag-cli

Dependencies

(8 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono^0.4.390.4.44up to date
 clap^4.5.274.6.0up to date
 clap-num^1.2.01.2.0up to date
 clap_complete^4.5.424.6.0up to date
 env_logger^0.11.60.11.10up to date
 humansize^2.1.32.1.3up to date
 log^0.4.250.4.29up to date
 time ⚠️^0.3.370.3.47maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.

tar: `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

RUSTSEC-2026-0067

In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata() follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

tar: tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

RUSTSEC-2026-0068

Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.

As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.

Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size — other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.